

REMARKS

Claims 11-30 are pending.

REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. 102

Claims 11-18 and 20-30 have been rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) as being anticipated by Alvares.

The Examiner's clear explanation of the rejection on page 3 of the Office Action is greatly appreciated.

As demonstrated below, amended independent claims 1 and 22 are clearly defined over the reference.

Amended claim 1 recites a system for protecting a computer device from unauthorized access, said protecting system being configured for receiving data addressed to said protected computer device, said protecting system comprising:

a controller for processing the data supplied from a data source for delivery to the protected computer device having a computer memory for storing software, the data source and the protected computer device being external with respect to the protecting system, the controller producing graphic information representing said data, the graphic information being produced in a graphic format inside said protecting system, and

an output buffer providing a path for transferring the graphic information to a monitor for presenting to a user of the protected computer device the data addressed to the protected computer device.

The Examiner interprets the computer system 100 and the graphics controller 107 to correspond to the claimed protecting system. The television or computer monitor in FIG. 2 of Alvarez is considered to correspond to the claimed protected computer device.

Although the claims have been amended to address the Examiner's position, it is respectfully submitted that the reference provides no reason to consider the computer monitor 164 or TV display 114 in FIG. 2 to correspond to the computer device protected from unauthorized access as claim 11 recites.

First, Alvarez does not expressly disclose that the computer monitor 164 or TV display 114 in FIG. 2 is protected from unauthorized access.

Moreover, as discussed below, the computer monitor 164 or TV display 114 in FIG. 2 are not inherently protected from unauthorized access.

In particular, FIG. 2 shows a computer system 100 having a graphics controller 108 that "advantageously operates to cause signals transmitted to the computer monitor 164 (hereinafter such signals are referred to as "computer monitor signals") to be of a type which allows accurate display by the monitor 164 of the computer monitor signals, while causing such signals to appear distorted if converted to a television-type analog signal such as NTSC or PAL and recorded by a VHS-type video recorder 116 as shown in FIG. 1b"(col. 3, lines 54-61).

Accordingly, the graphics controller 108 does not protect the monitor 164. Instead, it protects "computer monitor signals" from being converted to a television-type analog signal such as NTSC or PAL and recorded by a VHS-type video recorder 116.

However, the graphics controller allows the monitor 164 to accurately display protected signals. Hence, the graphics controller 108 does not protect the computer monitor 164.

Moreover, the reference provides no reasons to provide protection of the computer monitor 164. The reference specifies that the monitor 164 is an analog display that reproduces analog picture information received from a digital-to-analog converter, using synchronizing signals from horizontal and vertical timing generators.

As one skilled in the art would realize, an analog display stores no information. Therefore, the monitor 164 contains no data that can be protected. All information supplied to the monitor 164 is displayed at its screen. Therefore, it makes no sense to protect the information received by the monitor 164. It is noted that the reference specifies that the computer monitor 164 is “a conventional computer monitor” (col. 4, lines 15-16).

Further, the reference discloses that the pixel information is converted to a television compatible format signal 272 such as NTSC or PAL signals. The “signal 272 is transmitted to cause display of an image on a conventional television 114” (col. 4, lines 1-4).

Hence, the graphics controller 108 does not protect the TV set 114.

Moreover, a conventional television set stores no information that can be protected. In addition, all information supplied to the TV set 114 is displayed at its screen. Therefore, it makes no sense to protect the information received by the TV set 114.

Accordingly, the reference neither expressly nor inherently discloses that a television or computer monitor in FIG. 2 of Alvarez is a computer device protected from unauthorized access, as claim 11 requires.

Moreover, claim 11 is amended to specify that the protected computer device has a computer memory for storing software. Neither the computer monitor 164 nor the TV set 114 has a computer memory for storing software.

Further, claim 22, as amended, recites a method of preventing unauthorized access to a computer device using a protection device, the method comprising the steps of:

preventing by the protection device external with respect to the computer device having a computer memory for storing software, data addressed to the computer device from being supplied to the computer device,

supplying said data to the protection device, and
processing said supplied data to produce, inside the protection device, graphic information in a graphic format for supplying to a monitor, the graphic information representing the data addressed to the computer device.

First, as demonstrated above, Alvarez does not expressly or inherently disclose preventing unauthorized access to the computer monitor 164 or TV set 114 (considered to correspond to the computer device) using the graphics controller 108 (considered to correspond to the protection device), as claim 22 requires.

Moreover, the reference does not expressly or inherently disclose preventing by the graphics controller 108, data addressed to the computer monitor 164 or TV set 114 from being supplied to the computer monitor 164 or TV set 114, as claim 22 requires.

Further, claim 22 is amended to specify that the computer device has a computer memory for storing software. Neither the computer monitor 164 nor the TV set 114 has a memory for storing software.

Accordingly, the amended independent claims 11 and 22 are clearly defined over the prior art. Dependent claims 12-18, 20, 21 and 23-30.

REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103

Claim 19 has been rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Alvarez.

Claim 19 dependent from claim 11 recites that the controller (of the protecting system) is configured for replacing a name extension of a program file received from the source of data with another name extension.

The Examiner admits that Alvarez does not disclose “replacing a name extension of a program file received from the source of data with another name extension.” However, he takes

the position that “it is obvious that the teachings of Alvarez rename the extension of the program file since the file is converted from one format to another which can then be searched by the extension to add in processing of the reformatted file.”

The Examiner’s position is respectfully traversed. First, Alvarez discloses that “graphics controller 108 receives pixel information in the form of a signal from a video source (such as DVD player 106)” (col. 3, lines 62-64).

As one skilled in the art, no program file is sent from a video source. Further, pixel information from the DVD player has no name extension. Accordingly, the data source of Alvarez has no program file with a name extension that can be replaced with another name extension, as claim 19 requires.

The Examiner is respectfully reminded that the test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those having ordinary skill in the art. *Cable Electric Products, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc.*, 770 F.2d 1015, 226 USPQ 881 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In determining whether a case of prima facie obviousness exists, it is necessary to ascertain whether the prior art teachings appear to be sufficient to one of ordinary skill in the art to suggest making the claimed substitution or other modification. *In re Lulu*, 747 F.2d 703, 705, 223 USPQ 1257, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

As demonstrated above, the teaching of Alvarez is not sufficient to suggest the subject matter of claim 19.

Therefore, the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness is unwarranted.


In view of the foregoing, and in summary, claims 11-26 are considered to be in condition for allowance. Favorable reconsideration of this application, as amended, is respectfully requested.

Application No.: 10/509,423

To the extent necessary, a petition for an extension of time under 37 C.F.R. 1.136 is hereby made. Please charge any shortage in fees due in connection with the filing of this paper, including extension of time fees, to Deposit Account 500417 and please credit any excess fees to such deposit account.

Respectfully submitted,

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